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Abstract
Firstly, the deﬁnitions of the secret sharing schemes (SSS), i.e. perfect SSS, statistical SSS and computational SSS are given in an
uniform way, then some new schemes for several familiar rearrangements of access structures with respect to the above three types
of SSS are constructed from the old schemes. It proves that the new schemes and the old schemes are of the same security. A method
of constructing the SSS which realizes the general access structure by rearranging some basic access structures is developed. The
results of this paper can be used to key managements and access controls.
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1. Introduction
Secret sharing schemes (SSSs) which were independently proposed by Shamir [10] and Blakley [4] in 1979 play an
important role in cryptography and distributed computation. Informally, an SSS is a protocol between a dealer and a set
of participants who share a secret such that only participants in an authorized set can recover the secret. So far, only the
perfect case of SSS has been extensively investigated [11], requiring that the participants in any unauthorized set get
absolutely no information about the secret. Recently, two other cases of SSS with statistical security and computational
security were studied by Beimel and Ishai [2] in 2001 and Krawczyk [9] in 1993, respectively. Although fruitful results
for the perfect SSS have been obtained, it is still necessary to study the statistical SSS and the computational SSS.
Since all perfect SSS are trivially statistical ones, the statistical SSS are expected more powerful than the perfect SSS.
The computational SSS are closer to real life because the computational security requirement is good enough to resist
an adversary in real life. Beimel and Ishai [2] gave a statistical SSS with respect to an access structure for which no
perfect SSS is known to efﬁciently realize it. Some computational SSSwhich can efﬁciently realize more general access
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structures were considered in [1,12]. In this paper, we will give deﬁnitions for the three types of SSS in an uniform
way which is more helpful to understand the difference between them.
In SSSs, the access structures sometimes change. This happens when new participants join in, some participants
leave out, and so on. Hence, how to build a new scheme from old ones to realize the changed access structure is always
an important topic in SSS. Benaloh and Leichter [3] realized the union and intersection of two access structures in
the perfect case, and papers [5,7,8] discussed some other changes. In this paper we mainly discuss several familiar
rearrangements which contain most of the changes discussed so far. This problem was considered by Xiao and Liu [13]
in the perfect case. We further extend their results to the statistical case and the computational case which are much
closer to real implementation.
Finally, we construct the SSS for the general access structure by rearranging some basic access structures. The
construction is similar to Benaloh and Leichter’s [3] which was proposed from a traditional point in view of that
the access structures are equivalent to the underlying monotone formulae. Our construction is more direct and more
efﬁcient in some cases.
2. Preliminaries
Let N be the set of non-negative integers and R the set of real numbers. We call a function  : N → R negligible if
for every positive polynomial p(·), there exists a positive integer N such that (n)< 1/p(n) for all n ∈ N and n>N .
Suppose that P = {P1, . . . , Pn} is a set of participants and AS is a non-empty subset of 2P . Then the closure of
AS, denoted by cl(AS), is the set cl(AS) = {C ⊆ P | ∃B ∈ AS, such that B ⊆ C}. We call AS an access structure
over P if it satisﬁes the monotone ascending property: for any A ∈ AS and any A′ ∈ 2P , A ⊆ A′ implies A′ ∈ AS.
Obviously, if AS is an access structure, then AS = cl(AS) holds. The elements in AS are usually called the authorized
sets, and the elements in 2P \AS are called the unauthorized sets. Furthermore,B ∈ AS is a minimum authorized subset
of AS if A /∈AS whenever AB. Let ASm be the collection of all minimum authorized subsets of AS. It is obvious
that AS = cl(ASm). Actually, AS and ASm can be uniquely determined by each other.
An SSS is a protocol between a dealer and a group of participants, where the dealer can be viewed as an authority who
distributes shares of a secret to participants. More precisely, there is a distribution function : S×R → S1 ×· · ·×Sn,
where S is the secret-domain, Si the share-domain of Pi , 1 in, and R is the set of random inputs. Without loss of
generality,wemay assume that the setsS,R, Si are ﬁnite. A secret s ∈ S is shared as follows: the dealer randomly selects
r ∈ R and computes (s, r) = (s1, . . . , sn). Then he secretly sends the share si to Pi . For the sake of simplicity, we
denote by capital letters the randomvariablewhich ranges over the corresponding set. For instance, S denotes the random
variable ranging over the secret-domain S according to some speciﬁed distribution. For any A = {Pi1 , . . . , Pi|A| } ⊆ P
and s ∈ S, (s, R)|A is a random variable ranging over (S1 × · · · × Sn)|ASi1 × · · · × Si|A| induced by the random
variable R.
An SSS is said to (perfectly) realize an access structure AS if the following conditions hold:
(1′) Correctness: Participants of any authorized set can recover the secret by putting their shares together. Formally,
for all A ∈ AS, H(S | (S, R)|A) = 0 holds, where H(·) is the entropy function.
(2′) Security: Participants of any unauthorized set get absolutely no information on the secret. Formally, for allB /∈AS,
H(S | (S, R)|B) = H(S) holds.
The perfect SSS was deﬁned in [10,6]. We now give an equivalent deﬁnition by comparing the probability distribution
of two random variables. The equivalence can be easily proved and we omit the details.
Deﬁnition 1. An SSS is called perfect if the following conditions hold:
(1′′) Perfect correctness: For any A ∈ AS, there exists a reconstruction function ReA : (S1 × · · · × Sn)|A → S, such
that for any s ∈ S, Pr[ReA((s, R)|A) = s] = 1. Since the subscript for the reconstruction function is explicit
from the context, we often omit it and denote an SSS by SSS(,Re).
(2′′) Perfect security: For any B /∈AS and any s, s′ ∈ S, (s, R)|B and (s′, R)|B are identically distributed, i.e. for
any  ∈ (S1 × · · · × Sn)|B , Pr[(s, R)|B = ] = Pr[(s′, R)|B = ].
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Although perfect SSSs have been widely studied, in some practical cases, the security requirements can be relaxed
so that the distributions of the random variables (s, R)|B and (s′, R)|B are somewhat different. In fact, Krawczyk
[9] slightly relaxed the security requirement and studied the SSS with computational security, but he only considered
the extension of the security requirement. We now further extend the correctness requirement to the computational case
and get the complete deﬁnition for computational SSS. The concept of statistical SSS was proposed by Beimel and
Ishai [2] in which they focused on non-linear SSS. Inspired by their points, we deﬁne three types of SSS in an uniform
way so that the security requirement can be determined by the difference between (s, R)|B and (s′, R)|B . By our
uniform deﬁnition, the difference among these three types of SSS is clear.
Deﬁnition 2. An SSS is called statistical if the following conditions hold:
(1) Statistical correctness: For any A ∈ AS, there exists a reconstruction function Re : (S1 × · · · × Sn)|A → S such
that for any s ∈ S, Pr[Re((s, R)|A) = s]> 1 − (n) for some negligible function .
(2) Statistical security: For any B /∈AS and any s, s′ ∈ S, the statistical difference between(s, R)|B and(s′, R)|B
is negligible, i.e. 12
∑
 |Pr[(s, R)|B = ] − Pr[(s′, R)|B = ]|< (n), where  is a negligible function and 
runs over (S1 × · · · × Sn)|B .
Deﬁnition 3. An SSS is called computational, if the following conditions hold:
(1) Computational correctness: For any A ∈ AS, there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time computable function
Re : (S1 × · · · × Sn)|A → S such that for any s ∈ S, Pr[Re((s, R)|A) = s]> 1 − (n), for some negligible
function .
(2) Computational security: For any B /∈AS and any s, s′ ∈ S, no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm can distin-
guish between (s, R)|B and (s′, R)|B , i.e. for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D, |Pr
[D((s, R)|B, 1n) = 1] − Pr[D((s′, R)|B, 1n) = 1]|< (n), for some negligible function , where 1n is the
unary expression of n which is a auxiliary input to D as the security parameter.
3. Union and intersection of two access structures
In this section, we consider the realization of the union and intersection of two access structures.We construct the SSS
which realizes the rearranged access structures based on the original schemes and prove that the constructed scheme
is still perfect (resp. statistical, computational) if the original schemes are perfect (resp. statistical, computational).
Before giving formal descriptions, we use an example to explain the real life background for rearrangements of access
structures.
Suppose Alice and Bob each has an bank account with a corresponding password. For some reasons they want to
manage their accounts together, so they have to unite the two accounts and set a new password for the united account.
Now there are two ways to share the new password: If they trust each other, then they both get the whole password and
can enter the united account alone; If they do not trust each other, then each of them holds a share which cannot deduce
the password without the other share, that is, the united account can be accessed only by them together. The former
corresponds to the union of two access structures and the latter concerns the intersection of two access structures.
Let AS1, AS2 be two access structures over the set of participants P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, and SSS1(1,Re1), SSS2
(2,Re2) the SSSs which realize AS1 and AS2, respectively. For simplicity, we assume that SSS1 and SSS2 have the
same secret-domain and i : S × Ri → S(i)1 × · · · × S(i)n for i = 1, 2. First, we construct an secret sharing scheme
SSS(,Re) to realize AS = AS1 ∪ AS2 as follows.
Construction 1. Given a secret s ∈ S, by using the distribution functions1 and2, the dealer computes1(s, r1)=
(s11, . . . , s1n) and2(s, r2)= (s21, . . . , s2n), where r1 and r2 are independently and uniformly selected in R1 and R2,
respectively. Then the dealer secretly sends the share (s1i , s2i ) to Pi . For the sake of convenience, we denote
 : S × R1 × R2 → S(1)1 × · · · × S(1)n × S(2)1 × · · · × S(2)n ,
(s, r1, r2) 	→ (1(s, r1)|{P1}, . . . ,1(s, r1)|{Pn},2(s, r2)|{P1}, . . . ,2(s, r2)|{Pn}),
where Pi’s share-domain is S(1)i × S(2)i .
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Proposition 1 (Union of access structures). Suppose that SSS1 and SSS2 are perfect (resp. statistical, computational)
SSSs realizing AS1 and AS2, respectively. Then the scheme SSS given in Construction 1 is a perfect (resp. statistical,
computational) SSS which realizes AS = AS1 ∪ AS2.
Proof. The reader is referred to [13] for the perfect case. We only consider the statistical and the computational
cases.
From the construction, SSS(,Re) evidently satisﬁes the statistical (resp. computational) correctness require-
ment. We only need to consider the security requirement. For any s ∈ S andk B /∈AS, that is, B /∈AS1 and
B /∈AS2, we observe that (s, R)|B = (1(s, R1)|B,2(s, R2)|B), where R = (R1, R2) is a couple of indepen-
dent random variables. Then for any  ∈ (S(1)1 × · · · × S(1)n )|B,  ∈ (S(2)1 × · · · × S(2)n )|B , and for any s, s′ ∈ S,
we have
1
2
∑
,
|Pr[(s, R)|B = (, )] − Pr[(s′, R)|B = (, )]|
= 1
2
∑
,
|Pr[1(s, R1)|B = ]Pr[2(s, R2)|B = ] − Pr[1(s′, R1)|B = ]Pr[2(s′, R2)|B = ]|
 1
2
∑
,
|Pr[1(s, R1)|B = ]Pr[2(s, R2)|B = ] − Pr[1(s, R1)|B = ]
× Pr[2(s′, R2)|B = ]| + 12
∑
,
|Pr[1(s, R1)|B = ]Pr[2(s′, R2)|B = ]
− Pr[1(s′, R1)|B = ]Pr[2(s′, R2)|B = ]|
= 1
2
∑

|Pr[2(s, R2)|B = ] − Pr[2(s′, R2)|B = ]|
+ 1
2
∑

|Pr[1(s, R1)|B = ] − Pr[1(s′, R1)|B = ]|.
The second equality follows from the fact
∑

Pr[1(s, R1)|B = ] =
∑

Pr[2(s′, R2)|B = ] = 1.
Because SSS1, SSS2 are statistical and B /∈AS = AS1 ∪ AS2, we see that SSS also has statistical security.
Finally, we consider the computational case. For any B /∈AS, any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm T
and any s, s′ ∈ S, we claim |Pr[T (1(s, R1)|B,2(s, R2)|B, 1n) = 1] − Pr[T (1(s′, R1)|B,2(s, R2)|B, 1n) =
1]|< (n), for some negligible function . Otherwise there exists B /∈AS, a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
D, s, s′ ∈ S and positive polynomial p(·), such that |Pr[D(1(s, R1)|B,2(s, R2)|B, 1n) = 1] − Pr[D(1(s′, R1)
|B,2(s, R2)|B, 1n) = 1]|> 1/p(n), for inﬁnitely many n’s. Thus we can construct a polynomial-time algorithm
D′ to distinguish 1(s, R1)|B and 1(s′, R1)|B by using D as a subroutine. More precisely, on the input  ∈
(S
(1)
1 × · · · × S(1)n )|B , D′ randomly selects  ∈ (S(2)1 × · · · × S(2)n )|B according to the distribution of 2(s, R2)|B and
initiates D with the input (, , 1n). Finally, D′ outputs what D returns. Then we have |Pr[D′(1(s, R1)|B, 1n)= 1]−
Pr[D′(1(s′, R1)|B, 1n)=1]|=|Pr[D(1(s, R1)|B,2(s, R2)|B, 1n)=1]−Pr[D(1(s′, R1)|B,2(s, R2)|B, 1n)=
1]|> 1/p(n), for inﬁnitely many n’s, this contradicts to the hypothesis that SSS1 is a computational
SSS and B /∈AS1. Similarly for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm T and any s, s′ ∈ S,
we have |Pr[T (1(s′, R1)|B,2(s, R2)|B, 1n) = 1] − Pr[T (1(s′, R1)|B,2(s′, R2)|B, 1n) = 1]|< (n).
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Thus
|Pr[T ((s, R)|B, 1n) = 1] − Pr[T ((s′, R)|B, 1n) = 1]|
= |Pr[T (1(s, R1)|B,2(s, R2)|B, 1n) = 1] − Pr[T (1(s′, R1)|B,2(s′, R2)|B, 1n) = 1]|
 |Pr[T (1(s, R1)|B,2(s, R2)|B, 1n) = 1] − Pr[T (1(s′, R1)|B,2(s, R2)|B, 1n) = 1]|
+ |Pr[T (1(s′, R1)|B,2(s, R2)|B, 1n) = 1] − Pr[T (1(s′, R1)|B,2(s′, R2)|B, 1n) = 1]|
< 2(n).
Hence the computational security requirement is satisﬁed. 
Note that Construction 1 needs two independent random variables R1 and R2. To realize AS, it is possible but
sometimes difﬁcult to design a new SSS independent of SSS1 and SSS2 by using less randomness. Furthermore, some
improvements can be made to reduce the size of shares. For example, the dealer can send s1i to Pi for 1 in, and
send s2j to Pj only when Pj belongs to some A′ ∈ AS2\AS1. However, our construction is natural and convenient
in both design and implementation. Furthermore, it preserves the perfect (resp. statistical, computational) security of
original schemes, so it is more practical.
Let AS1,AS2,SSS1(1,Re1) and SSS2(1,Re2) be as before. We now construct an SSS which realizes AS =
AS1 ∩ AS2 as follows.
Construction 2. Given a secret s ∈ S, the dealer ﬁrst uniformly selects s1 ∈ S. Then by using distribution functions
1 and 2, the dealer computes 1(s1, r1) = (s11, . . . , s1n) and 2(s − s1, r2) = (s21, . . . , s2n), where r1, r2 are
selected independently and uniformly in R1 and R2, respectively. After that, Pi gets his share (s1i , s2i ) for 1 in.
For the sake of convenience, we denote
 : S × R1 × R2 → S(1)1 × · · · × S(1)n × S(2)1 × · · · × S(2)n ,
(s, r1, r2) 	→ (1(s1, r1)|{P1}, . . . ,1(s1, r1)|{Pn},2(s − s1, r2)|{P1}, . . . ,2(s − s1, r2)|{Pn}).
Note that s1 is a randomly chosen element in S and should be included in the variables of . Here we omit it from the
variables for the coherence of expressions.
Proposition 2 (Intersection of access structures). Suppose that SSS1 and SSS2 are perfect (resp. statistical, computa-
tional) SSSs which realize AS1 and AS2, respectively. Then the scheme SSS given in Construction 2 is a perfect (resp.
statistical, computational) SSS which realizes AS = AS1 ∩ AS2.
Proof. The reader is referred to [13] for the perfect case. For the other two cases, it is easy to show that SSS satisﬁes
the statistical (resp. computational) correctness requirement by the hypothesis that SSS1 and SSS2 are statistical (resp.
computational).
As for the security requirement, we ﬁrst observe that for any B /∈AS and s ∈ S,(s, R)|B = (1(s1, R1)|B,2(s −
s1, R2)|B), where s1 is uniformly chosen in S and R = (R1, R2) is a couple of independent random variables. Without
loss of generality, we may assume that B /∈AS2. Then for any s, s′ ∈ S, and any  ∈ (S(1)1 × · · · × S(1)n )|B,  ∈
(S
(2)
1 × · · · × S(2)n )|B , we have
1
2
∑
,
|Pr[(s, R)|B = (, )] − Pr[(s′, R)|B = (, )]|
= 1
2
∑
,
| 1|S|
∑
s1∈S
(Pr[(1(s1, R1)|B,2(s − s1, R2)|B) = (, )]
− Pr[(1(s1, R1)|B,2(s′ − s1, R2)|B) = (, )])|
 1|S|
∑
s1∈S
⎛
⎝1
2
∑
,
|Pr[(1(s1, R1)|B,2(s − s1, R2)|B) = (, )]
− Pr[(1(s1, R1)|B,2(s′ − s1, R2)|B) = (, )]|
⎞
⎠
. (1)
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Similar to the proof of Proposition 1, we can prove that (1) is negligible. Hence, the security requirement is satisﬁed
in the statistical case.
Similarly, for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm T, we have that Pr[T ((s, R)|B, 1n)=1]=(1/|S|)∑s1∈S
Pr [T (1(s1, R1)|B,2(s − s1, R2)|B, 1n) = 1]. Thus for any s, s′ ∈ S, we have
|Pr[T ((s, R)|B, 1n) = 1] − Pr[T ((s′, R)|B, 1n) = 1]|
 1|S|
∑
s1∈S
|Pr[T (1(s1, R1)|B,2(s − s1, R2)|B, 1n) = 1]
− Pr[T (1(s1, R1)|B,2(s′ − s1, R2)|B, 1n) = 1]|. (2)
Again similar to the proof of Proposition 1, we can prove that (2) is negligible. Hence, SSS satisﬁes the security
requirement in the computational case. 
Although Constructions 1 and 2 seem trivial, they can be used to construct an SSS which realizes the general access
structure, so they are important in both theory and practice. We will show this point in Section 5.
4. Substitution of participants and other rearrangements
In real life, a participant can sometimes be replaced by several other participants. Suppose that P ′ = {P ′1, . . . , P ′n}
is a set of participants and AS′ is an access structure over P ′. Then SSS′(′,Re′) is an SSS which realizes AS′ with
the secret-domain S′ and the share-domain S′i for 1 in, that is, ′ : S′ × R′ → S′1 × · · · × S′n. Suppose that
P ′′ = {P ′′1 , . . . , P ′′m} is another set of participants with an access structure AS′′ and SSS′′(′′,Re′′) is an SSS which
realizes AS′′ with the secret-domain S′1, that is,
′′ : S′1 × R′′ → S′′1 × · · · × S′′m. Replacing P ′1 by P ′′, we get the new
set of participants P = {P ′′1 , . . . , P ′′m, P ′2, . . . , P ′n} and deﬁne an access structure over P by
AS = {A ⊆ P |A ∩ P ′ ∈ AS′} ∪ {A ⊆ P |A ∩ P ′′ ∈ AS′′ and (A ∩ P ′) ∪ {P ′1} ∈ AS′}.
We now construct an secret sharing scheme SSS(, Re) for the realization of AS with the secret-domain S′.
Construction 3. For any given secret s′ ∈ S′, the dealer ﬁrstly computes ′(s′, r ′) = (s′1, . . . , s′n). Then with theﬁrst share s′1, he computes ′′(s′1, r ′′) = (s′′1 , . . . , s′′m), where r ′ and r ′′ are independently and uniformly selected in
R′ and R′′, respectively. Finally, he secretly sends s′i to P ′i , 2 in, and sends s′′j to P ′′j , 1jm. For the sake of
convenience, we denote
 : S′ × R′ × R′′ → S′2 × · · · × S′n × S′′1 × · · · × S′′m,
(s′, r ′, r ′′)	→(′(s′, r ′)|{P ′2}, . . .,′(s′, r ′)|{P ′n},′′(′(s′, r ′)|{P ′1}, r ′′)|{P ′′1 }, . . .,′′(′(s′, r ′)|{P ′1}, r ′′)|{P ′′m}).
Then for 2 in, P ′i has share-domain S′i and for 1jm, P ′′j has share-domain S′′j .
Proposition 3 (Substitution of participants). Suppose that SSS′ and SSS′′ are perfect (resp. statistical, computational)
SSSs which realize AS′ and AS′′, respectively. Then the scheme SSS(,Re) given in Construction 3 is a perfect (resp.
statistical, computational) SSS which realizes AS.
Proof. The reader is referred to [13] for the perfect case. Similar to the proof of Proposition 2, the correctness of the
SSS can be easily proved and the proof is omitted. We next argue the security requirement. For any B /∈AS, there are
two cases to be considered:
(1) (B ∩ P ′) ∪ {P ′1} /∈AS′ and B ∩ P ′′ ∈ AS′′. For any s, s′ ∈ S′ and any possible value of (s, R)|B , denoted by
, we have
Pr[(s, R)|B = ] =
∑
u∈S′1
Pr[(′(s, R′)|B∩P ′ ,′′(u, R′′)|B∩P ′′) = (′, ′′)] · Pr[′(s, R′)|{P ′1} = u], (3)
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where ′ = |B∩P ′ , ′′ = |B∩P ′′ and R = (R′, R′′) is a couple of independent random variables. So it holds that
1
2
∑

|Pr[(s, R)|B = ] − Pr[(s′, R)|B = ]|
 1
2
∑
′
∑
u∈S′1
|Pr[′(s, R′)|B∩P ′ = ′]Pr[′(s, R′)|{P ′1} = u]
− Pr[′(s′, R′)|B∩P ′ = ′]Pr[′(s′, R′)|{P ′1} = u]|
∑
′′
Pr[′′(u, R′′)|B∩P ′′ = ′′]
= 1
2
∑
′,u
|Pr[′(s, R′)|B∩P ′ = ′]Pr[′(s, R′)|{P ′1} = u]
− Pr[′(s′, R′)|B∩P ′ = ′]Pr[′(s′, R′)|{P ′1} = u]|, (4)
where the last equality follows the fact that
∑
′′ Pr[′′(u, r ′′)|B∩P ′′ = ′′] = 1 for any given u ∈ S′1. Similar to the
proof of Proposition 1, we can show that (4) is negligible.
Now we consider the computational security. Suppose on the contrary, that there exist s′, s′′ ∈ S′, a probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm T and a positive polynomial p(·) such that |Pr[T ((s′, R)|B, 1n) = 1] − Pr[T ((s′′, R)
|B, 1n) = 1]|> 1/p(n), for inﬁnitely many n’s. By using T as a subroutine, we can construct a polynomial-time
algorithm T ′ to distinguish′(s′, R′)|(B∩P ′)∪{P ′1} and′(s′′, R′)|(B∩P ′)∪{P ′1}. But the SSS′ is a computational SSS and
(B ∩ P ′) ∪ {P ′1} /∈AS′, we get a contradiction.
(2)B ∩P ′ /∈AS′ andB ∩P ′′ /∈AS′′. In this case, we still ﬁrst consider the statistical case. As in case (1), we have Eq.
(3). For any given  and u, where  and u are as before, deﬁne ,u =Pr[(′(s, R′)|B∩P ′ ,′′(u, R′′)|B∩P ′′)= (′, ′′)].
Hence, we get a multi-set D = {,u | u ∈ S′1}. Deﬁne a random variable  over D with the probability distribution
Pr[=,u]=Pr[′(s, R′)|{P ′1} =u]. This random variable is well deﬁned because
∑
u Pr[′(s, R′)|{P ′1} =u]=1 for
any given s ∈ S′. Thus Eq. (3) can be transformed into Pr[(s, R)|B = ] = E. Similarly, we can deﬁne a random
variable  with Pr[ = Pr[(′(s′, R′)|B∩P ′ ,′′(u, R′′)|B∩P ′′) = (′, ′′)]] = Pr[′(s′, R′)|{P ′1} = u]. Also, we get
Pr[(s′, r)|B = ] = E. Thus
1
2
∑

|Pr[(s, R)|B = ] − Pr[(s′, R)|B = ]| = 12
∑

|E − E|E
1
2
∑

| − |.
Let ,u = Pr[(′(s, R′)|B∩P ′ ,′′(u, R′′)|B∩P ′′) = (′, ′′)] and ,u′ = Pr[(′(s′, R′)|B∩P ′ ,′′(u′, R′′)|B∩P ′′) =
(′, ′′)] be any given samples of  and , respectively. Because SSS′ and SSS′′ are statistical SSSs andB ∩P ′ /∈AS′,
B ∩P ′′ /∈AS′′, similar to the proof of Proposition 1, we can show that 12
∑
 |,u − ,u′ | is negligible. Since there are
only ﬁnite samples, E 12
∑
 | − | is negligible.
As to the computational case, we observe that for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm T, Pr[T ((s, R)
|B, 1n) = 1] =∑u∈S′1 Pr[T (
′(s, R′)|B∩P ′ ,′′(u, R′′)|B∩P ′′ , 1n) = 1] · Pr[′(s, R′)|{P ′1} = u]. By using the method
similar to that in the statistical case above, i.e. by regarding the Pr[T ((s, R)|B, 1n) = 1] as an expected value of a
random variable, we can prove the computational security in this case. 
In the end, we just mention some other rearrangements that are sometimes encountered in real life. Because the
proofs and constructions are either simple or similar to those of the previous ones, we omit the details.
Proposition 4 (Contraction of access structures). Let P = {P1, . . . , Pn} be the set of participants, AS an access
structure over P and SSS(,Re) the SSS which realizes AS. Let P ′ = {Pi1 , . . . , Pim} ⊆ P and AS′ = {A ⊆ P ′ |
A ∈ AS}. Assume that ′ = |P ′ , i.e. ′ : S × R → Si1 × · · · × Sim , ′(s, r) = (si1 , . . . , sim). Then ′ with the
corresponding reconstruction algorithm Re is a perfect (resp. statistical, computational) SSS which realizes AS′ over
P ′, when SSS(,Re) is perfect (resp. statistical, computational).
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Proposition 5 (Reducing authorized sets). Let P ={P1, . . . , Pn} be the set of participants and AS an access structure
over P. Let SSS(,Re) be the SSS which realizes AS. Then AS′ = AS − 2{Pi1 ,...,Pim } is another access structure over
P, and we have a perfect (resp. statistical, computational) SSS which realizes AS′ based on the original perfect (resp.
statistical, computational) scheme SSS(,Re).
Certainly there are many other rearrangements of access structures and some of which can be considered as combi-
nations of the cases in this paper. Hence, we can also give some constructions for them in the perfect, statistical and
computational cases.
5. Decomposition and realization of general access structures
Based on the rearrangements and constructions in Section 3, we now design the SSS for the general access structure
by rearranging some basic access structures through union and intersection only.We ﬁrst recall that any access structure
AS over P = {P1, . . . , Pn} can be written as AS = cl({A1, . . . , Ar}), where r ∈ N and Ai ⊆ P for 1 ir . Then the
following lemma is an obvious but important result concerning the union and intersection of access structures. We here
omit the details.
Lemma 1. Let A and B be two access structures over P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, where A = cl({A1, . . . , Ar}) and B =
cl({B1, . . . , Bs}) for some r, s ∈ N, Ai, Bj ⊆ P , 1 ir , 1js. Then A ∪ B = cl({A1, . . . , Ar , B1, . . . , Bs}),
andA ∩B= cl({A1 ∪ B1, . . . , A1 ∪ Bs, . . . , Ar ∪ B1, . . . , Ar ∪ Bs}).
The result of Lemma 1 can be easily extended to union and intersection of more than two access structures. In order
to generate all access structures over P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, we deﬁne the basic access structures as ASi = cl({{Pi}}) for
1 in, that is, ASi consists of all subsets of P that contain the participant Pi . The following proposition claims that
AS1, . . . ,ASn actually generate all access structures through union “∪” and intersection “∩”.
Proposition 6. Any access structure over P can be decomposed into the basic access structures AS1, . . . ,ASn con-
nected through union “∪” and intersection “∩”.
Proof. Suppose that AS is an arbitrary access structure over P. Then AS can be written as AS = cl({A1, . . . , Am}),
where m ∈ N and Ai ⊆ P for 1 im. By Lemma 1, it follows that
AS = cl({A1}) ∪ · · · ∪ cl({Am}). (5)
It sufﬁces to show for every i, cl({Ai}) has the required form of decomposition.
Since Ai ⊆ P , we can assume that Ai has the form {Pi1 , . . . , Pik }, where k ∈ N and 1 i1 < i2 < · · ·< ikn.
Clearly, cl({Ai})=cl({{Pi1 , . . . , Pik }})=cl({{Pi1 , . . . , Pik−1}})∩ASik = (cl({Pi1 , . . . , Pik−2})∩ASik−1)∩ASik =· · ·=
ASi1 ∩ · · · ∩ ASik . Hence for 1 im, cl(Ai) can be decomposed as a combination of AS1, . . . ,ASn through union
and intersection. Finally, by Eq. (5) and Lemma 1, the proposition is proved. 
For simplicity, we say that AS can be expressed by AS1, . . . ,ASn, if it can be decomposed into AS1, . . . ,ASn
connected by union “∪” and intersection “∩”. The following proposition indicates that the basic access structures can
be uniquely decided.
Proposition 7. Suppose thatA1, . . . ,Am are m access structures over P such that any access structure over P can
be expressed byA1, . . . ,Am, whileAi cannot be expressed byA1, . . . ,Ai−1,Ai+1, . . . ,Am for 1 im. Then
m = n andAi = ASi under the proper labels, where ASi = cl({{Pi}}).
Proof. First, we argue that for 1 in, ASi cannot be decomposed anymore, that is, if ASi=B1∪B2 orASi=B1∩B2,
then eitherB1 =ASi orB2 =ASi . (In this sense, we say that the decomposition is minimal.) Suppose on the contrary,
that (1) ASi =B1 ∪B2 with B1 = ASi and B2 = ASi . It follows that B1ASi and B2ASi . Because {Pi} ∈ ASi ,
we have {Pi} ∈ B1 or {Pi} ∈ B2. Without loss of generality, we may assume that {Pi} ∈ B1. Then by the monotone
ascending property, ASi ⊆ B1 which contradicts to B1ASi ; (2) ASi = B1 ∩ B2 with B1 = ASi and B2 = ASi .
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Therefore, ASiB1 and ASiB2. Take A ∈ B1 − ASi and B ∈ B2 − ASi , i.e.A ∈ B1, B ∈ B2 and Pi /∈A ∪ B.
Then A ∪ B ∈ (B1 ∩B2) − ASi contradicts to ASi =B1 ∩B2.
Since ASi cannot be decomposed any more and ASi can be expressed byA1, . . . ,Am, ASi =Aj holds for some
j ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Under proper labels, we have Ai = ASi for 1 in and nm. Now, by Proposition 6 and the
hypothesis thatAi cannot be expressed byA1, . . . ,Ai−1,Ai+1, . . . ,Am, we get m = n. 
Before constructing an SSS with respect to the general access structure, we give an (perfect) SSS which realizes the
basic access structure ASi for 1 in.
Construction 4. Suppose thatP={P1, . . . , Pn}andAS=cl({{Pi}}) for some i ∈ Nand1 in.AnSSSwhich realizes
AS with the secret-domain S is constructed as follows: For any given s ∈ S, the dealer selects r1, . . . , ri−1, ri+1, . . . , rn
independently and uniformly from S. Then he sends s to Pi and rj to Pj for 1jn and j = i.
Since for any access structure over P, there are only union and intersection operations in the ﬁnal decomposition,
an SSS can be constructed based on Constructions 1, 2 and 4. Actually, the proof of Proposition 6 provides a general
way to decompose an arbitrary access structure. When dealing with speciﬁc access structures, some simpliﬁcations can
help to shorten the size of shares, i.e., to reduce data expansion. See the example below.
Example 1. Suppose that P = {P1, P2, P3, P4} and the access structure AS = cl({{P1, P2}, {P1, P4}, {P2, P3, P4}}).
We are to design an SSS to realize AS with secret-domain S which is a ﬁnite ﬁeld. Deﬁne ASi =cl({{Pi}}) for 1 i4.
Then according to the proof of Proposition 6, we have AS = (AS1 ∩ AS2) ∪ (AS1 ∩ AS4) ∪ (AS2 ∩ AS3 ∩ AS4). By
Simplifying the decomposition, we get
AS = [AS1 ∩ (AS2 ∪ AS4)] ∪ (AS2 ∩ AS3 ∩ AS4). (6)
Note that AS2 ∪ AS4 = cl({{P2}, {P4}}), AS2 ∩ AS3 ∩ AS4 = cl({{P2, P3, P4}}) and they both can be easily realized.
Thus we deﬁne the basic access structures: A1 = cl({{P1}}), A2 = cl({{P2}, {P4}}), and A3 = cl({{P2, P3, P4}}).
Hence AS= (A1 ∩A2)∪A3 and the procedure of constructing an SSS for the secret s ∈ S is displayed below, where
r1, r2 and r3 are selected independently and uniformly in S.
P1 P2 P3 P4
s − r3 RealizeA1 with the secret s − r3 RealizeA1 ∩A2
r3 r3 RealizeA2 with the secret r3 with the secret s
r2 r1 s − r2 − r1 RealizeA3 with the secret s
That is, P1 has share s − r3, P2 has r3 and r2, P3 has r1 and P4 has s − r2 − r1 and r3.
There are some other decompositions and the corresponding realizations for AS. For instance, AS can be de-
composed as
AS = cl({{P1, P2}}) ∪ cl({{P2, P3, P4}}) ∪ cl({{P1, P4}}),
and the corresponding scheme can be described in the following table, where r1, r2, r3 and r4 are selected independently
and uniformly in S:
P1 P2 P3 P4
r1 s − r1 Realize cl({{P1, P2}}) with the secret s
r2 r3 s − r2 − r3 Realize cl({{P2, P3, P4}}) with the secret s
r4 s − r4 Realize cl({{P1, P4}}) with the secret s
However, we observe that the former scheme uses less randomness, that is, it needs r1, r2 and r3, while the latter
scheme needs r4 in addition, and the total size of shares in the former scheme is 6 log |S| while the latter is 7 log |S|,
hence the former scheme is better. This is because that in the former scheme, we use the simpliﬁed decomposition (6).
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It is obvious that in the ﬁnal form of decomposition, the less minimum authorized sets Pi is contained in, the shorter
share he will get in our construction. Hence proper simpliﬁcation for decompositions of access structures in some cases
is desirable.
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